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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

23 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [REDACTED] A/NIO/NESA

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SUBJECT : Issues in NSC Study of Soviet Responses to US Military
Actions Against Libya

1. Attached are a memorandum to Admiral Nance for your signature and accompanying materials requested for the NSC study on Soviet Responses to US Military Actions Against Libya.

2. The CIA analysis here appended concludes with regard to the reasons for, and significance of, Libyan overbuilding/overstocking of military supplies:

"The Libyans do not seem to have accumulated this weaponry to serve as a stockpile for Soviet contingencies. If Tripoli and Moscow had made such an arrangement, the storage of armaments for extended periods would have been handled in a different way."

The rationale for this conclusion is provided in the accompanying materials.

3. The State Department contribution to the current NSC study (which has been provided to us informally) states in part,

". . . the Soviets could move in man-power to directly utilize the large stockpile of sophisticated equipment in Libya . . . The (military) equipment purchased from the Soviets may serve as pre-positioned stocks for the Soviets or as a resource for third country transfer."

4. The State language does not represent an Intelligence Community view. In fact, NIE 35/36-80, issued in July 1980, concluded with reference to the Libyan stockpile, that

". . . it is highly unlikely that the present Soviet-Libyan arms arrangements include any consideration for the pre-positioning of materiel for Soviet forces."

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No exceptions or reserves were taken by any of the participating agencies to that language.

5. There are other analytical positions outlined in the State Department contribution that do not reflect Community-wide views. These include references to Qadhafi's regime as "a functional Soviet proxy" and to "the role of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military and security services in designing and managing Libyan destabilization programs." On the subject of growing Soviet influence, it is asserted that "any change in alignment of the Libyan regime will be a move closer to the Soviet Union." This view is not shared by NFAC analysts either; they note that it is impossible to predict who Qadhafi's successor will be and what his relationship with the Soviet Union will be.

6. I am calling these issues to your attention because discussion of this subject within the NSC is likely to prove contentious and NFAC analysts who are contributing to the current NSC study are concerned that their views be accurately reflected if the study is to be presented as a coordinated Community analysis.

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Attachments

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